into a platoon of Americans, mainly from 507: but the platoon was concerned with getting on to its own objective-a position along the northeast flank of the 82d's sector. It moved off at right angles to the line which TIMMES was taking: within a very few minutes thereafter he was beginning to find trouble. The Germans had taken up fire positions along the top of the migh ground; apparently, there weren't very many of them, but some small arms fire from beyond the hedges on both flanks began to take slow toll of TILMES' men. By the time TIMMES started to move into the village, he realized that his estimate of the situation had been entirely wrong. The enemy was not being engaged by any other Americans; the only firing from the village was being directed against him; and he felt that he was gradually losing control of his own force without doing any hurt to the Germans. The attack drew machine gun fire from out of the tops of some of the buildings; that simply spurred TIMES' decision to withdraw and reorganize. He had lost 7 or 8 men, some of them killed. During the withdrawal, enemy fire again harassed his flanks; some of the Germans in AMFREVILLE had followed him out, and one machine gun made itself especially obnexious, trailing the group by one hedgerow distance. By 0930 TIMIES had taken up a defensive position in an orchard next the marsh, somewhat less than a dle north of the CAUQUICNY church. He put his men to work digging in and otherwise organizing the position. That mornthey had abandoned a 57 AT gun in one of the gliders and